After many years of cutting a fairly small figure in the larger affairs of the world South Korea has spent the past decade transforming its profile among the middle powers, especially in the Asian region. Ramon Pacheco Pardo sees this as the result of a quiet but determined strategy combining economic clout, “soft power” cultural influence, diplomatic initiatives, and a growing military profile.
Pardo has covered some of this territory before, especially in his 2022 outing, Shrimp to Whale: South Korea from the Forgotten War to K-Pop. His intention in South Korea’s Grand Strategy is to examine the formative policy aspects of the transition, and he spends a considerable amount of time—perhaps too much—discussing the geopolitical concept of grand strategy and how a middle power can develop and implement big ideas. This gives the book a dauntingly academic tone, and it is not always clear how the theoretical framework applies to South Korea’s situation. After all, the perpetual conflict between North Korea and South Korea is unique, as Pardo admits, and has necessarily been a key issue for South Korean leaders since the end of the Korean War.
He emphasizes that since the country’s transition to democracy in 1988, there has been an essential continuity in strategic thinking across partisan divides, aiming to maximize the country’s freedom of action. This has required a careful balancing act aimed at a constant reinforcement of alliances, especially the crucial relationship with the US, while keeping a certain amount of distance. There is an awareness that, despite the friendship and connections with the US, the interests of the two countries do not always coincide and might become more divergent and competitive over time.
As Pardo notes, the current president, Yoon Suk-yeol (who was elected in May 2022), has moved towards even broader thinking, with less day-to-day attention on North Korea and reduced rhetoric on the possibility of reunification. The book only covers the first six months of Yoon’s term, which is a pity, because the past year has seen Yoon engage in a whirlwind of diplomatic visits, trade agreements, grants of aid, and revised relationships, widely seen as a counter to China’s rise. While Yoon is not particularly popular at home, even his detractors admit that he has been extremely active on the world stage. “South Korea wants status through recognition as an influential middle power,” says the author.
The country is indeed a middle power, but it wants to yield influence – in other words, to contribute to and shape international relations.
At the same time, Yoon has pushed for South Korea to enhance its military self-sufficiency, including in cyberwarfare, and has attempted to build a reputation for the country as a major exporter of high-tech military equipment, although these trends have been long in the making. He has also upgraded South Korea’s participation in international bodies, agencies, and conferences. Had the book come out a year or two hence, it could have provided more analysis of Yoon’s presidency. In the longer view, Yoon’s presidency could mark a milestone in South Korea’s strategy, with many plans reaching fruition.
Pardo’s focus on policymakers—the political and administrative elites—means that book has relatively little scrutiny of the role of public opinion in determining which policy options are in fact available. A critical example of this is the distance that any South Korean leader must keep from Japan, due to the depth and extent of historical and territorial disputes, and the reservoir of ill-feeling in the community, especially among older Koreans.
In the concluding chapter Pardo tackles the key question as to whether South Korea’s grand strategy has been successful, and his answer is a conditional yes. South Korea might not yet be the pivotal player it aspires to be although it is on its way there, and it has vastly improved its capacity for action that is independent of its allies. But the relationship with North Korea remains intractable, and has arguably become more unstable and dangerous as North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have grown.
In the end, South Korea’s Grand Strategy makes some important points, and while more suited to academics and policymakers than general readers, it provides a broad context to the thinking of its leaders as well as a useful historical overview.