The late British historian Paul Johnson devoted an entire chapter of his 1983 classic Modern Times to what he called the “Bandung Generation”—the leaders of former European colonies in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia who in April 1955 gathered in Bandung, Indonesia to form a non-aligned movement in the midst of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Johnson dismissed the group as a collection of moral poseurs “adept at words, but not much else”. Andrea Benvenuti, an associate professor of international relations at the University of South Wales, is not as dismissive about Bandung and its organizers as Johnson was, but he, too, concludes that Bandung failed to bring about its professed goal of “Afro-Asian solidarity”.
Benvenuti’s book, however, is not about Bandung in general, but rather its role in Indian foreign policy as envisioned by its prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru was at first quite skeptical about convening such a conference. His vision for Indian foreign policy was to create a “zone of peace” in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East which would be free of Cold War alignments. Nehru opposed US efforts to organize anti-communist alliances in Asia and the Middle East. He viewed the US-led Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) as dangerous to peace. The backdrop for Bandung included the Korean and Indochina Wars, the Geneva Conference, and the crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Nehru saw the United States as a greater threat to peace than the Soviet Union or China. Benvenuti quotes a Commonwealth Relations Office assessment that Nehru had an “utter distrust” of the United States, and considered it an “ignorant power” that was “drunk and hopelessly unreliable”. SEATO and CENTO were viewed as an attempt to “encircle” India. Even worse from India’s perspective, was warming relations between the US and Pakistan.
Benvenuti notes that “the seeds of Bandung were planted in Colombo in the spring of 1954,” when Nehru and the leaders of Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, and Ceylon met to discuss “security and economic challenges.” This meeting coincided with the meeting of the great powers in Geneva. The Colombo Conference, however, revealed disagreements among the participants over the threat of communism. The organizer of the conference, Ceylon’s prime minister Sir John Kotelawala, was a fierce anti-communist. Pakistan and Burma also feared communist aggression and subversive activities. Nehru downplayed the communist threat, insisting that China be invited to Bandung.
Benvenuti shows that Nehru placed great hopes in what he viewed as an emerging Sino-Indian leadership of a non-aligned movement. The problem, however, was that China was not non-aligned—it was part of what was then called the Sino-Soviet bloc. Nehru’s continual misplaced faith in China is a theme running throughout Benvenuti’s book. Before Bandung, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai traveled to New Delhi for talks with Nehru. Later, Nehru visited Beijing for talks with Zhou and Mao Zedong. Paul Johnson described Nehru’s feelings for Zhou and Mao as “hero worship”. What is clear is that Nehru came away from those meetings convinced that China could partner with India in the creation of a “third force” in Asia whose goal was “peaceful coexistence” with both superpowers. Events would later demonstrate Nehru’s naivete or misjudgment.
Nehru wasn’t the first or last statesman to be beguiled by Zhou Enlai. Even the consummate realist Henry Kissinger suffered a similar fate during his meetings with Zhou in the early 1970s. “Behind [Zhou’s] sophisticated, urbane, even affable demeanor”, writes Benvenuti, “hid a hardened, ruthless and committed communist”. China’s goal at Bandung was to enlist India and other Afro-Asian nations in its anti-American foreign policy. Nehru’s goal was to enlist China in its plan to institute the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations; equality; and peaceful coexistence. China paid nothing more than lip service to the Five Principles. Nehru’s mistake, Benvenuti explains,
was not only did he downplay the revolutionary nature of Mao’s communism, but he also overestimated China’s commitment to peaceful coexistence, which Beijing saw as a temporary tactical expedient to undermine American containment and expand its influence in the developing world.
Zhou received “star treatment” when he arrived at Bandung. Twenty-nine countries participated, representing 60 percent of the world’s population. Nehru and India set the agenda, but cracks in Afro-Asia solidarity were evident over communism, Nehru’s cherished Five Principles, and collective defense. China was the big winner at the conference–its influence in the developing world was enhanced, except in those countries led by pro-US, strong anti-communist leaders. “In the wake of Bandung”, Benvenuti explains,
China launched an unrelenting charm offensive in the Afro-Asian world … by hosting foreign leaders, sending high ranking officials abroad, providing economic aid and sponsoring delegations of all sorts—from cultural and economic to religious and educational.
Nehru’s vision of Sino-Indian partnership in Asia soon faded. India “grew increasingly wary of Chinese intentions.” China, Benvenuti writes, “remained committed to revolutionary change domestically and internationally.” China cracked down on dissent in Tibet and launched the ill-fated Great Leap Forward that cost tens of millions of lives. And in 1962, China attacked India over disputed territory near the McMahon Line and in Aksai Chin. Chinese forces had the better of the fighting and later declared a ceasefire. “For Nehru”, writes Benvenuti, “the 1962 border war was a major foreign policy disaster.” The border dispute continues to this day. And ironically, India has moved closer to the United States in its rivalry with China. Nehru’s foreign policy has been effectively reversed.