In Myanmar today, resistance against the 2021 coup and the military regime, has spread across the entire country, and fighting has engulfed the state, displacing millions and leaving the country in a state of turmoil. To explain how we got to this point, and what is the future for both the resistance movement and the Myanmar military, veteran journalist Bertil Lintner provides in The Golden Land Ablaze a detailed background of Myanmar’s political development since Independence in 1948. Over six chapters, Bertil analyzes the coup itself, the military, ethnic politics, the role of China, Myanmar’s politicians and finishes with an overview of the situation today and predictions for future developments.
To ground his analysis in history, Lintner brings his decades-long experience of covering Myanmar to explain a story whose roots long predate 1 February 2021. Yet he also highlights how the situation today is very different from in the past: while there were many protests after the 1962 coup, widespread strikes in 1974 and nationwide protests in 1988, these all eventually faded away after weeks or months of indiscriminate military abuses, this isn’t happening now. The protests and rebellion to military rule are now deeply rooted in Myanmar society and the revolution shows no sign of slowing down.

To explain why the military seized power in a coup after years of seemingly embracing democratic reform, Lintner details how and why the military dominated and controlled political life for so long. After Burmese independence, a series of conflicts broke out across the country. As a way to pay for the resources required to fight a series of insurgencies, the army started undertaking business ventures and by the mid-1950s, the army was “becoming a state within a state.” The power of the military became further entrenched after the 1962 coup, when General Ne Win directed the military to “both to defend the country and to play a dominant role in politics and economic development.” The military had by then become a “highly centralised military dictatorship” and “had established itself as the new ruling class.”
The role of the international community is also critical to understand. Back in 2011, under the Thein Sein government, Myanmar undertook a series of reforms, after which the international community were quick to welcome Myanmar back into the fold. Here Bertil argues there was a failure from many within the international community to realize the reality of Myanmar’s political developments, and the rationale that underpinned them. The military was worried it had become too reliant on China and risked losing its independence. Therefore its decision to release political prisoners, relax media censorship and seemingly to embrace democracy was just a token gesture, and was certainly not indicative of a real adoption of democratic ideals. The military always intended to stay in power, you only had to look to its 2008 constitution, which enshrined the military’s power and authority to see that. Yet the international community rushed to turn Myanmar from “an international pariah to the darling of the western world.” Just as the Myanmar military pretended to adopt democratic ideals due to realpolitik, the international community were so keen to find a new partner in their strategic ambitions to counter China’s rise in the region, that they failed to critically analyze the sincerity of such moves.
While it may have been China that led the military to their brief flirtation with democracy, China has continued to be one of the most important external powers regarding Myanmar’s future. Indeed, Lintner writes that “No country has interfered in Myanmar politics and internal conflicts as much as China.” China has been vital for Myanmar since the military launched a bloody crackdown on the 1988 protest movement, the aftermath of which saw Myanmar sanctioned and blacklisted by many western countries, leaving China as one of the few marketplaces available. Today, China plays a major role in Myanmar politics, has strong links with the military government and is a major supplier of goods and support. Yet China is also involved and in contact with many ethnic armed groups, providing them strong leverage inside Myanmar.
Although the scale of the resistance movement’s assaults and achievements in the battlefield are unprecedented, Lintner argues that victory is not imminent. “There is no unity among the various Burman and ethnic resistance groups.” He highlights strategic and resource limitations to the resistance movement which does not “appear to be operating in accordance with a well thought out strategy encompassing the entire country.” Resistance forces don’t have anti-aircraft capabilities capable of regularly defending against air strikes, helicopter gunships and fighter jets. He is aware this viewpoint will not be popular among the resistance and their supporters, however he remains convinced that this is a “war neither side can win by military means, and caught in the middle is the civilian population, which is bound to suffer the most.” No matter what happens in Myanmar, Lintner is sure of one thing: “the main victims will be the people of Myanmar, who for decades have been suffering under the brutal rule of a power obsessed clique of men in green.”
While Lintner has covered much of this topic Lintner in greater detail in other books, as a one-volume introduction to the coup and its political background, this is a strong overview.
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